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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
New York State is considering a system of public campaign fi nancing for state elections similar to New York City’s small 
donor matching fund program. Th e city’s system matches at a six-to-one ratio the fi rst $175 a city resident contributes 
to a candidate participating in the voluntary program. In endorsing a reform for the state that mirrors the city system, 
New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo claimed that a multiple-match public fi nancing system would bring greater 
equality to state elections. 
Candidates who have participated in both New York City and New York State elections agree. Th ey have told us that by 
pumping up the value of small contributions, the New York City system gives them an incentive to reach out to their 
own constituents rather than focusing all their attention on wealthy out-of-district donors, leading them to attract more 
diverse donors into the political process. Th is is markedly diff erent, they explained, from how they and other candidates 
conduct campaigns at the state level.
Th ese claims, if true, suggest that the city’s public fi nancing system has contributed to a fundamental change in 
the relationship between candidates and their donors in New York City. In this new joint study, we analyze data 
on donations to candidates in New York City in the most recent sets of elections at the city and state levels to see 
whether the data are consistent with these claims — in other words, whether greater participation by small donors 
in city elections translates into more diverse participation.  
Th e results for the elections we analyzed are remarkable. Small donors to 2009 City Council candidates came from 
a much broader array of city neighborhoods than did the city’s small donors to 2010 State Assembly candidates. 
• Almost 90 percent of the city’s census block groups were home to someone — and often, many people 
— who gave $175 or less to a City Council candidate in 2009. By contrast, the small donors in the 2010 
State Assembly elections came from only 30 percent of the city’s census block groups. 
• Th e neighborhoods in which City Council small donors reside are more representative of New York 
City as a whole. Th ey have lower incomes, higher poverty rates, and higher concentrations of minority 
residents than the neighborhoods where State Assembly small donors reside. All of these diff erences are 
statistically signifi cant (p < .01). 
• Small donor participation in some of the city’s poor black, Asian, and Latino neighborhoods was far 
more robust in City Council contests. Twenty-four times more small donors from the poor and predomi-
nately black Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood and the surrounding communities gave money to candidates 
for the City Council than for the State Assembly. For Chinatown the advantage was 23 to 1. In the heavily 
Latino neighborhoods of Upper Manhattan and the Bronx, it was 12 to 1.1 Th e data support the claim that 
small donor matching funds help bring participants into the political process who traditionally are less 
likely to be active. 
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• Th e poor neighborhoods of color we analyzed were also fi nancially more important to City Council 
candidates than to State Assembly candidates. In fi nancial terms, the donors from Bedford-Stuyvesant 
and surrounding neighborhoods were more than 11 times as important for City Council candidates 
as they were than for candidates running for State Assembly. For Chinatown, the fi gure was 7 to 1. 
Contributors from Upper Manhattan and the Bronx were more than three times as important in City 
Council elections.
We do not discount the relevance of other factors, such as term limits for City Council and city residents’ greater 
engagement in city elections, that may lead to greater diversity of participation in the City Council context. But 
available evidence — documented in the Methodology and Limitations section of this report — suggests that 
New York City’s public fi nancing system plays a signifi cant role in bringing about the striking results we found. 
Ultimately, our data are consistent with the claims made by candidates who have run in both city and state 
elections. Th e city’s public fi nancing system gives candidates an incentive to reach out to a broader and more 
diverse array of constituents to fund their campaigns. In so doing, the city’s public fi nancing system appears to 
have achieved one of its key goals — strengthening the connections between public offi  cials and their constituents.
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INTRODUCTION
New York State is considering a system of public campaign fi nancing for state elections similar to the one New 
York City uses for municipal elections. In that system, the city puts up six dollars in public matching funds for 
each of the fi rst $175 that a city resident contributes to a candidate participating in the voluntary program.  
One of the key purposes of the city’s matching fund program is to strengthen the connections between public 
offi  cials and their constituents by bringing more small donors into the process and making them more important 
to the candidates’ campaigns. A previous paper by the Campaign Finance Institute showed that matching funds 
heighten the number and role of small donors in city elections and would be likely to do the same at the state 
level.2 But this only begins to tell us whether matching funds make the system more representative. We also want 
to know whether the new donors are similar to previous ones, or whether public fi nancing changes the mix of 
who contributes. For example, does a greater role for small donors mean more participation by minorities, or by 
donors who are lower down on the economic ladder?
In recent interviews conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice, legislators and candidates said the city’s 
matching funds led them to look to a more diverse set of donors. According to Jose M. Serrano, a member of the 
New York State Senate who once served on the City Council:
I’m in a community, the south Bronx, where there aren’t a lot of people with great personal wealth. 
Th is is a working class community, and my neighbors can’t drop $1,000. But being able to raise $10, 
and with the match being so signifi cant, really made these small donors very important. It not only 
empowered me, but it empowered the community as well. So public campaign fi nancing empowers 
communities as well as candidates... Once I ran for the Senate, it was extremely diff erent... I was taking 
on a very well-fi nanced candidate. My campaign was raising money, but we knew we couldn’t raise as 
much from local people because we weren’t getting matches. As a result, we started seeing more high-
dollar fundraisers.
Eric Adams, a New York State Senator who is now running for city offi  ce, echoed this view:
On the state level, I’m targeting people who are in politics, either as lobbyists or unions or corporations... 
If I reach out to a lobbyist, I may be able to get a $2,000 check in comparison to reaching out to a single 
person who could only write a $50 or a $100 check. So the bulk of my time would probably go to those 
professionals in the business of politics... It’s just the opposite in the city. In the borough president race 
that I’m now embarking on, most of my calls are to small donors: everyday people. And a large number 
of people who contribute to my campaign have never contributed to a campaign before; have never 
really participated in politics.3
I.
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Th ese interviews tell an important story: the incentives built into New York City’s public fi nancing program 
shifted the way these politicians went about their business. Th eir testimony shows how they looked for new 
people to participate in their campaigns and that the participants were more diverse than traditional donors. 
And tellingly, they are saying that they behaved diff erently as candidates when they ran for city offi  ce, with its 
matching fund public fi nancing system, than when they ran for a New York State offi  ce without it. 
Th is joint study by the Brennan Center for Justice and the Campaign Finance Institute tests whether these 
powerful but anecdotal claims are supported by the available evidence from the most recent state and municipal 
elections. To do so, we compared donors to candidates in the City Council elections of 2009, where there was a 
public fi nancing program, to the donors to candidates in the State Assembly elections of 2010, where there was 
no such program. We compared the City Council and State Assembly races because those electoral districts are 
similar in size and because doing so allowed us to look at the giving patterns of the same city residents in diff erent 
elections. 
Th e results are striking. We fi nd that small donors to 2009 City Council candidates (who gave a total of $175 or 
less to a candidate) came from a much broader range of neighborhoods than small donors to 2010 State Assembly 
candidates. Small donors who gave money to a City Council candidate came from 89 percent of the city’s census 
block groups (CBGs). By contrast, the small donors in the State Assembly elections came from only 30 percent 
of the city’s CBGs. Almost everyone in the city, from the richest of neighborhoods to the poorest, lived within a 
city block or so of someone who contributed to the 2009 City Council elections. Th e donors looked and lived 
like the neighbors in everyone’s neighborhoods, because they came from literally all over the city. Th is was not 
even close to being true for the donors in the 2010 New York State Assembly elections. Nor was it true for other 
state-level offi  ces. 
To be sure, we only compared donor participation patterns in one election cycle for City Council and one for 
the State Assembly. It remains hard to isolate the role of the city’s public fi nancing program in creating these very 
diff erent levels and kinds of donor participation at the city and state levels. Other factors, such as term limits and 
the potentially greater engagement of city residents in city elections, also play a role. But as subsequent sections 
of this report demonstrate, strong evidence suggests that the city’s public fi nancing program is an important part 
of the explanation for the diff erences in the state and city donor profi les. 
It makes sense that more small donors — from a more diverse set of communities — participated under the city’s 
system in 2009. Matching funds give city candidates an incentive to look actively for small contributions. In 
addition, the city requires candidates who take public funds to raise a threshold number of contributions within 
their own constituencies. As a result, the donors who gave to City Council candidates in 2009 came from a 
broader swath of less wealthy and more racially diverse neighborhoods than did the donors to candidates for the 
State Assembly in 2010. Th e anecdotal claims that politicians have made about New York City’s matching funds 
thus seem to be consistent with our data. Th e matching funds appear to bring more donors into the system from 
a more diverse set of neighborhoods, making the pool of donors more representative of the population as a whole.
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REPORT METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS
Earlier, we used the words “neighborhood” and “census block group” (CBG) as if they were interchangeable. 
However, in our general understanding, a neighborhood is quite a bit larger than a CBG — a geographic unit 
created by the U.S. Census Bureau. According to the Census Bureau, a block group “will generally contain 
between 600 and 3,000 people … with an optimal size of 1,500.”4  
To allow like-to-like comparisons, we primarily compare the CBGs of city donors who gave to candidates for 
City Council, which has a matching fund program, to the CBGs of city donors who gave to candidates for State 
Assembly, which does not. By limiting our coverage to block groups within the city for both sets of elections, 
we control for the demographic and political characteristics of the potential donor pool. We compare these two 
elected offi  ces because the size of their constituencies is about the same. For additional comparison, we also 
include tables in the Appendix for city residents who give to candidates for other state offi  ces. 
To assign donors to CBGs we used a vendor, Aristotle International, to pinpoint the donors’ locations from their 
addresses in campaign fi nance disclosure fi les. However, we used a donor’s contribution for the CBG calculations 
only if we were confi dent that the address was residential. Because the city’s reporting rules require donors to 
provide a residential address, while state law permits an employment address, this meant setting aside more 
state donors’ contributions (30 percent) than city contributions (10 percent). Th is explains some of the density 
diff erences in our maps, but not enough to alter the fundamental conclusions. Th e neighborhood discussions 
later in this paper use an estimation procedure, explained in the footnotes, to correct for this diff erence.
Before embarking on our substantive analysis, we should note that this study is not without limitations. First, 
we note that there are no available data on the income, race, or education of individual donors. Th e fi ndings in 
this paper are therefore about the CBGs within which donors reside and the clear diff erences between the CBGs 
from which the candidates running for the two offi  ces are drawing their donors. Given the small size of a CBG, 
however, their demographic characteristics speak clearly to the everyday surroundings of the individual donor. 
In addition, we recognize that it is diffi  cult to draw defi nitive conclusions about the value of public fi nancing for 
donor diversity from just one set of elections. However, the available data on previous elections — especially in 
the City Council context — give us no reason to believe that the results would be substantially diff erent if we had 
compared other elections instead.5 
One small part of the explanation for diff erences in donor participation between the 2009 City Council and 2010 
State Assembly is sheer quantity. Th e 2009 City Council candidates raised $12.9 million in private contributions, 
while 2010 State Assembly candidates from the city’s Assembly districts raised $9.3 million. If the Assembly 
candidates had also raised $12.9 million, some of that additional money presumably would have come from small 
II.
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donors — but probably not much. Donors who gave $175 or less to State Assembly races accounted for less than 
6 percent of those candidates’ total funds. By contrast, 2009 City Council candidates raised about 30 percent of 
their private money from such donors.
Other substantive diff erences between City Council and State Assembly elections might have a noticeable eff ect 
on our data. For example, there are term limits for City Council but not for State Assembly. City residents may 
also simply be more engaged in city elections. At the same time, however, prior fi ndings give us comfort that the 
city’s public fi nancing program is an important part of the explanation for the diff erence between the state and 
city donor profi les. 
As a recent Campaign Finance Institute study highlighted, candidates who did not participate in the public 
fi nancing system in the 2009 City Council elections raised only 15 percent of their private money from donors 
who gave $250 or less. For participating candidates that fi gure was 37 percent. In other words, participating 
candidates raised two-and-a-half times as much of their private money from small donors as did non-participating 
candidates, even before we include public matching funds.6 Although non-participating City Council candidates 
raised more money from small donors (15 percent) than State Assembly candidates (6 percent), the substantial 
diff erence between participating and non-participating City Council candidates cannot be explained by factors 
that distinguish city from state elections. Th e diff erence seems most logically attributable to changes in candidate 
and small donor behavior under the city’s public fi nancing system. 
Due to the absence of data from the pre-public fi nancing era in the city, we cannot know whether participation 
rates for city elections were ever precisely the same as they are now for state elections.7 A look at small donor 
participation under the city system in 1997—when there was a one-to-one public fi nancing match in place—and 
then again in 2009, however, suggests that small donor participation rates in city elections might have looked more 
like participation rates now do for the state. As a prior Brennan Center study found, small donor participation 
was 40 percent greater in 2009 than in 1997, the last election before the single match system transitioned to a 
multiple match system.8 In other words, before the adoption of the multiple-match system, City Council small 
donor participation rates were lower than they are now.
Finally, we note that people do not modify their behavior overnight in response to changed incentives. Th erefore, 
this study does not pinpoint exactly what donor giving in state elections would look like with a public fi nancing 
system in place. Instead, we consider whether the available data on recent elections is consistent with the notion 
that such a system could help the state realize some of the diversity benefi ts the city has seen from increased small 
donor participation.
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CITYWIDE COMPARISON: NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL DONORS 
AND STATE ASSEMBLY DONORS 
Th e following data, and the maps that illustrate it, compare small donor participation by New York City residents 
in 2010 New York State Assembly races to New York City residents’ participation in 2009 New York City 
Council races. Th e diff erences between these two sets of contests suggest there is a signifi cant connection between 
the public fi nancing system for municipal elections, which amplifi es the impact of small donors, and political 
participation from a broader and more diverse array of neighborhoods and communities.
As Table 1 shows, candidates for the City Council in 2009 raised small contributions from donors who lived in 89 
percent of the city’s CBGs. By contrast, candidates who ran for the State Assembly in 2010 received small donor 
support from only 30 percent of the city’s CBGs. Moreover, small donors to the gubernatorial and State Senate 
races came from even fewer CBGs than did the small donors to State Assembly candidates. 
Offi ce and Election Year Percent of CBG’s with Donors Whose 
Contributions to a Candidate Aggregate To ...
$1-175 $176-$999 $1000 or more
City Council candidates, 2009 89% 43% 11%
State Assembly candidates, 2010 30% 17% 6%
State Senate candidates, 2010 25% 15% 7%
Gubernatorial candidates, 2010 11% 7% 7%
All Statewide and State Legislative candidates combined, 2010 43% 26% 13%
Table 1. Percentage Of CBGs In New York City With Donors Giving Varying Amounts To Candidates For 2009 New York City 
Council And Various 2010 New York State Offi ces.
Donors Mapped, Citywide:  Standing alone, small donor participation from 89 percent of the city’s CBGs is 
impressive enough. But the greater inclusiveness of New York City’s public fi nancing system becomes even more 
apparent from maps showing the geographic distribution of the city’s small and large donors.
Figures 1 and 2 show in red those CBGs where there is at least one donor who gave $1,000 or more to a State 
Assembly candidate or a City Council candidate, respectively. Th e maps resemble what one would see for most 
elections in other cities and states. As Figures 1 and 2 show, the geographic coverage is spotty for both elections: 
just 11 percent of CBGs in the City Council context, and just 6 percent in the State Assembly context, are home 
to a donor who gave $1,000 or more. Most of the large donors in New York City come from neighborhoods in 
Manhattan, especially the Upper East and Upper West Side, and from Staten Island. Th ese neighborhoods not 
only have low levels of poverty but are known for their greater affl  uence. 
III.
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Figure 1 (left): CBGs In New York City With At Least One Donor Giving $1,000 Or More To New York State Assembly Candidate, 
2010; Figure 2 (right): CBGs In New York City With At Least One Donor Giving $1,000 Or More To New York City Council 
Candidate, 2009.
Th e next maps, Figures 3 and 4 below, show in red participation by small donors — those who gave a total of 
$175 or less — to State Assembly and to City Council candidates, respectively. Th e Campaign Finance Institute’s 
analysis of donor records in all 50 states has shown that in most elections more people give small contributions 
than give large ones even though they do not provide the bulk of the money fi nancing campaigns.9 As a result, it is 
no surprise to see that Figure 3 (mapping CBGs with small donors in 2010 State Assembly races) is more broadly 
populated than Figures 1 and 2 (mapping CBGs with large donors). 
Figure 3: CBGs In New York City With At Least One Donor Giving $175 Or Less To New York State Assembly Candidate, 2010.
Th e CBGs colored in red in Figure 3 represent 30 percent of the city’s total CBGs. While 30 percent is not trivial, 
it still leaves large swaths of Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx entirely off  the map of State Assembly donors. And 
the Assembly’s 30 percent does not compare to the 89 percent of CBGs that are home to small donors who gave 
to City Council candidates. Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 4 illustrates the point dramatically. 
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Figure 4: CBGs In New York City With At Least One Donor Giving $175 Or Less To New York City Council Candidate, 2009.
 
Of course, the patterns in Figures 3 and 4 leave open the possibility that just one or a handful of residents in 
each CBG account for the breadth of geographic representation among small donors. In fact, this is true for the 
State Assembly contests, but not the City Council ones. Th e following maps, Figures 5 and 6, show the number 
of small donors in each CBG. Figure 5 shows that the overwhelming majority of CBGs with small donors who 
contributed to State Assembly races only had between 1 and 5 such donors. Indeed, only 2 percent of CBGs in 
New York City were home to more than fi ve small donors to a 2010 State Assembly race. Over half of the CBGs 
with any small donors contributing to a State Assembly race had only one such small donor.
Figure 5: Number Of Donors In New York City Giving $175 Or Less To New York State Assembly Candidates In 2010, By CBG.
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By contrast, Figure 6, which displays the numbers of small donors contributing to City Council races, shows not 
1 to 5 small donors in the typical CBG, but 6 to 25 such donors or more. Indeed, City Council contests boast 20 
times more CBGs with more than fi ve donors than State Assembly contests have. Moreover, CBGs with a small 
donor presence were about four times as likely to have only one small donor in the State Assembly context as in 
the City Council context.
Figure 6: Number Of Donors In New York City Giving $175 Or Less To New York City Council Candidates In 2009, By CBG.
In short, Table 1 and the maps above show that candidates for City Council are searching for and fi nding 
small donors in every corner of the city. And the fact that they are fi nding multiple donors in most of these 
neighborhoods suggests this is not just a collection of random events, but rather a refl ection of the incentives the 
city’s public fi nancing system provides to candidates to reach out to their own constituents for support. In other 
words, the citywide evidence refl ects the anecdotal experience the candidates described.
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NEW YORK CITY DONORS: DIVERSITY IN DETAIL
City Council candidates are looking all over the city for their small contributions, while State Assembly candidates 
are not. Th is is bound to have an eff ect on the overall diversity of each donor pool. Table 2 makes clear the 
greater diversity small donors bring into City Council elections by comparing the demographic characteristics of 
neighborhoods in which small donors live to those in which large donors live at both the City Council and State 
Assembly levels. 
Characteristics of the block groups Block Groups with Donors Whose 
Contributions to a Candidate Aggregate To ...
$1-175 $176-$999 $1000 or more
Median Household Income 1999, CBGs w donors (Entire city: $38,293)
     City Council $43,754 $58,551 $70,798
     Assembly $49,973 $57,452 $66,255
Poverty % in CBGs with donors (Entire city: 21%)
     City Council 19% 13% 11%
     Assembly 16% 13% 12%
Non-white % in CBGs with donors (Entire city: 55%)
     City Council 54% 35% 25%
     Assembly 39% 30% 21%
Education: % not completing high school (Entire city: 28%)
     City Council 26% 18% 14%
     Assembly 22% 18% 14%
Education: % with Bachelor’s degree or beyond (Entire city: 27%)
     City Council 30% 44% 52%
     Assembly 36% 43% 51%
Table 2: Comparing Demographic Features Of CBGs With Donors Giving At Varying Levels To Candidates For New York City 
Council (2009) And New York State Assembly (2010).10
A comparison across the three columns in Table 2 shows that both within City Council and State Assembly 
races, small donors come from CBGs with lower median household incomes, higher non-white populations, 
higher levels of poverty, and lower levels of education than those of larger donors. But when we compare the 
Council to the Assembly, the City Council’s small-donor CBGs have lower incomes, higher poverty rates, higher 
percentages of minority residents, and lower levels of education than the Assembly’s small-donor CBGs. All of 
these diff erences are statistically signifi cant (p < .01). Th e fi gures for minority participation are especially striking. 
IV.
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National surveys repeatedly have shown donors disproportionately to be white.11 Th is remains true of the CBGs 
in which the Assembly’s small donors reside. But, remarkably, the donors to City Council candidates came from 
CBGs whose non-white population percentage (54 percent) is almost the same as the whole city’s (55 percent).
Th e fact that small donors to City Council contests reside in communities as diverse as the city itself traces back to 
the same matching fund incentives — and the requirements for a minimum number of in-district donors — that 
lead City Council candidates to raise small-donor contributions from their own constituents in the fi rst place. To 
illustrate the diversity of the donors’ neighborhoods more clearly, Figure 7 shows the level of poverty across New 
York City. Th e more saturated the shading for the census tracts in this map, the higher the percentage of adult 
residents living below the federal poverty line.
Figure 7 (left): Poverty rate In New York City, Among Voting-Age Residents, By 2010 Census Tract; Figure 6 (right, and page 13 
above): Number of Donors In New York City Giving $175 Or Less To New York City Council Candidates In 2009, By CBG.
 
Figure 7 shows that there are large clusters of high-poverty tracts in the Bronx and Brooklyn, in particular. A quick 
comparison with Figure 6 — the map illustrating the numbers of small donors participating in New York City 
Council contests — shows that even in these high-poverty areas, there are substantial numbers of small donors 
contributing to City Council candidates. Viewed in conjunction with the preceding maps, particularly Figures 
3 and 5, which show the far lower levels of participation in State Assembly races, Figure 7 affi  rms the value of 
the City Council public fi nancing system in bringing all New Yorkers, including those who live in high-poverty 
communities, into the political process. 
Th e demographic maps of the city in Appendix A underscore the point further. Viewed in conjunction with 
Figure 7 — the map showing poverty rates across New York City — they illustrate that the city’s poorer black, 
Latino, and Asian residents live in largely segregated communities. Yet Figures 4 and 6 above show signifi cant 
participation by New Yorkers from all of these communities in New York City races under the public fi nancing 
system, participation that does not exist in elections for State offi  ce, as shown above in Figures 3 and 5.  
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SELECT NEIGHBORHOODS: A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF 
SMALL DONOR PARTICIPATION IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 
AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR
Th e benefi ts of New York City’s public fi nancing system in enhancing diversity in the political process become 
even more apparent on closer examination of small donor contributions from the city’s low-income and minority 
communities. Th e sets of maps below analyze and illustrate small donor participation in State Assembly and 
City Council contests by residents of predominantly minority and high-poverty communities in Brooklyn, 
Chinatown, and Upper Manhattan and the Bronx. Th ese maps illustrate the far greater small donor participation 
from low-income and minority neighborhoods under the city’s public fi nancing system than in New York State 
Assembly contests.
A. Brooklyn: Bedford-Stuyvesant and Surrounding Neighborhoods
Figure 8 shows the number of donors giving $175 or less 
to a State Assembly candidate in each CBG in Bedford-
Stuyvesant, a predominantly black and low-income 
neighborhood in Brooklyn, and surrounding communities 
(see Figures 10 and 11 below). Th ere were only an estimated 
331 small donors to Assembly candidates from all of these 
983 block groups combined. In areas represented in off -
white on the map, there were no small donors. Just one 
CBG on this map is home to more than fi ve small donors, 
and only seven CBGs are home to more than two.  
By contrast, there were an estimated 7,987 small donors to 
City Council candidates from the same CBGs. Th e diff erence 
is remarkable and is visually striking in Figure 9. Twenty-
four times as many small donors from these neighborhoods 
gave to City Council as to Assembly candidates.  Even if we 
adjust for the fact that Assembly candidates raised less money 
overall than City Council candidates, there still were nearly 
17 times more small donors from these neighborhoods’ 
CBGs to City Council than to Assembly candidates. 
V.
This part of Brooklyn includes the district of 
State Senator Eric Adams, who is now running 
for city offi ce under the public fi nancing system. 
He told us: “At the city level . . . people are 
doing small house parties with small donations 
from $25 to $10 to $50. That is unheard of at 
the state level, where you are looking for larger 
contributions. It’s an entirely different energy 
around raising money. If you’re writing me a 
$10 or $25 check because . . . you don’t have 
a great deal of money, then that contribution 
is important to you . . . you’re going to want 
to know what type of person I am, because 
that $25 is harder to come by. So people have 
come out, started to volunteer, and started 
to participate. There’s a relationship they’re 
developing with the person they’re making the 
contribution to. I have a large number of fi rst-
time donors, and those fi rst-time donors have 
also turned into fi rst-time participants in the 
process . . . ” 
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Figure 8: Number Of Donors Giving $175 Or Less To New York State Assembly Candidates in 2010, By CBG, in Bedford-Stuyvesant 
And Surrounding Communities In Brooklyn. 
Figure 9: Number Of Donors Giving $175 Or Less To New York City Council Candidates In 2009, By CBG, In Bedford-Stuyvesant 
And Surrounding Communities In Brooklyn. 
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It is particularly instructive to look at these districts from the candidates’ perspectives by considering how important 
the CBGs’ money was to the candidates’ overall campaign funds. State Assembly candidates received just $87,000 
from these block groups. Although the block groups comprised 17 percent of the block groups in the city, they 
provided barely 1 percent of the money that Assembly candidates raised from city residents.12 By contrast, City 
Council candidates received $637,000 in private funds from these CBGs, comprising 5.4 percent of the individual 
private contributions raised by City Council candidates in 2009.13 When public matching funds are included, the 
block groups were responsible for about $2.5 million, which in turn amounted to nearly 11 percent of all of the 
combined money that City Council candidates raised in 2009.14 In other words, the proportional importance of 
contributions from Bedford-Stuyvesant and surrounding communities was about 11 times greater in the City 
Council elections of 2009 than in the elections for State Assembly in 2010.
When viewed alongside Figure 9, Figures 10 and 11 confi rm the value of the city’s public fi nancing system in 
increasing the diversity of neighborhoods participating fi nancially in city elections. Even in the block groups with 
the highest concentrations of residents living in poverty and the highest concentrations of black residents, there 
are many small donations to City Council candidates.
Figure 10 (left): Percentage Of Voting-Age Residents Who Are Black, By 2010 CBG, In Bedford-Stuyvesant And Surrounding 
Communities In Brooklyn; Figure 11 (right): Poverty Rate Among Voting-Age Residents, By 2010 Census Tract, In Bedford-
Stuyvesant And Surrounding Communities In Brooklyn. 
B. Chinatown and Surrounding Neighborhoods
Figure 12 shows the number of donors giving $175 or less to a State Assembly candidate in each of the 72 CBGs in 
Chinatown and surrounding neighborhoods, areas with a high concentration of Asian residents and residents living 
in poverty (see Figures 14 and 15 below). As Figure 12 demonstrates, there were very few small donors in the State 
Assembly contests in these neighborhoods: an estimated 40 such donors reside in the small set of CBGs pictured. 
No CBG on this map is home to more than six small donors to Assembly candidates. Indeed, only three of the 
block groups shaded in blue are home to more than two small donors. By contrast (see Figure 13) Chinatown and 
surrounding neighborhoods supplied an estimated 932 small donors to candidates for City Council. Th is was more 
than 23 times the number of small donors who gave to candidates running for the Assembly. 
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Figure 12: Number Of Donors Giving $175 Or Less To New York State Assembly Candidates In 2010, By CBG, In Chinatown And 
Surrounding Communities. 
Figure 13: Number Of Donors Giving $175 Or Less To New York City Council Candidates In 2009, By CBG, In Chinatown And 
Surrounding Communities. 
Th e neighborhoods’ donors were also more fi nancially signifi cant to candidates for City Council elections than 
to candidates for the State Assembly. New York City Council candidates received $122,000 in private individual 
donations from the block groups pictured in Figure 13. Th is was 1 percent of the total private individual funding 
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raised by City Council candidates citywide.15 When public funds are included, the neighborhoods’ residents 
were responsible for $407,000 of the Council candidates’ funds. Th is represents 1.8 percent of all the public and 
private money the Council raised for the elections of 2009.16 By contrast, State Assembly candidates received just 
$21,076 from these block groups, amounting to only 0.2 percent of all money candidates raised from New York 
City residents in State Assembly contests.17 In other words, the importance of contributions from Chinatown 
and the surrounding communities was about eight times as great in the City Council elections of 2009 as 
in the State Assembly elections of 2010.
Figures 14 and 15 illustrate the value of the city’s public fi nancing system in increasing small donor participation 
from these predominantly low-income and minority communities in city elections. Even in the block groups with 
the highest concentrations of poverty and the highest concentrations of Asian residents, there are still many small 
donations to City Council candidates from Chinatown and the surrounding neighborhoods.  
Figure 14 (left): Percentage Of Voting-Age Residents Who Are Asian, By 2010 CBG, In Chinatown And Surrounding Communities. 
Figure 15 (right): Poverty Rate Among Voting-Age Residents, By 2010 Census Tract, In Chinatown And Surrounding Communities. 
C. Upper Manhattan and the Bronx
Figure 16 is a map of 1,067 CBGs in the Bronx and Upper Manhattan. Th ese CBGs, almost 19 percent of the 
CBGs in the city, are predominantly Latino and have large concentrations of residents living in poverty (see 
Figures 18 and 19). Only an estimated 644 of these neighborhoods’ residents gave $175 or less to a candidate for 
the Assembly in 2010, and only six of the CBGs are home to more than fi ve small donors.  By contrast, Figure 17 
shows that many more of these neighborhoods’ residents contributed to candidates for the City Council in 2009. 
We estimate that there were 7,480 small donors to City Council candidates from these CBGs, which is about 12 
times the number of small donors from these CBGs to candidates for the State Assembly. 
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Figure 16: Number Of Donors Giving $175 Or Less To New York State Assembly Candidates In 2010, by CBG, In The Bronx And 
Upper Manhattan. 
Figure 17: Number Of Donors Giving $175 Or Less To New York City Council Candidates In 2009, By CBG, In The Bronx And 
Upper Manhattan. 
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Putting these numbers in the context of total contributions 
received in the city and state races makes clear how New 
York City’s public fi nancing system amplifi es the signifi cance 
of small donors. State Assembly candidates raised $288,000 
in all private contributions from these block groups; this 
amounted to just 3.2 percent of all the money that the city’s 
candidates for the Assembly raised from New York City 
residents.18 By contrast, New York City Council candidates 
received $727,000 in private individual contributions from 
the same set of block groups, comprising 6.2 percent of the 
total private individual contributions made to all City Council 
candidates in New York City.19 When public matching funds 
are included, City Council candidates received $2,638,000 
from these block groups; this was 11.5 percent of all public 
and private money candidates raised in City Council contests 
in 2009.20 In other words, the block groups displayed in 
Figures 16 and 17 were more than three times as fi nancially 
important in the City Council elections of 2009 as in the 
State Assembly elections of 2010.
Figures 18 and 19 underscore how the city’s public 
fi nancing system increases the diversity of neighborhoods 
participating in city elections. Th ese maps show that the 
Bronx and Upper Manhattan neighborhoods pictured are majority Latino and have extremely high poverty rates. 
Yet even in the block groups and neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of poverty and the highest 
concentrations of Latino residents, there are still many small donations to City Council candidates.
Figure 18 (left): Percentage Of Voting-Age Residents Who Are Hispanic, By 2010 CBG, In The Bronx And Upper Manhattan; 
Figure 19 (right): Poverty Rate Among Voting-Age Residents, By 2010 Census Tract, In The Bronx And Upper Manhattan. 
The neighborhoods pictured include the State 
Senate district of Senator Jose M. Serrano 
(quoted earlier) who said: “With the city’s 
program, you can actually throw fundraisers 
where you invite community residents instead 
of lobbyists and corporate types . . . So I would 
have small fundraisers in local restaurants, 
house parties became more signifi cant . . . And 
when you do it this way, you start noticing that 
these small donations start piling up . . . Smaller 
campaign donations increase your pool of 
donors signifi cantly, and you end up with 
hundreds of small donors who you can also 
reach out to. It creates a grassroots situation 
where the person may only give $10 or $50, but 
then he or she is also able to feel like an actual 
part of the campaign, and to feel that it’s not 
an ivory tower campaign. So it increases donor 
and volunteer engagement at an organic level. 
Without the match, fundraising becomes all-
encompassing. You’re doing it all the time. I’ve 
found that when I was running for the Senate, 
we had to focus much more on fundraising and 
call time.”
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APPENDIX A: DEMOGRAPHIC MAPS
Th is appendix provides a visual depiction of the concentrations of black, Latino, and Asian voting-age residents 
in New York City. More saturated areas on the maps indicate areas with higher concentrations of the relevant 
racial/ethnic group. 
Th at New York City’s housing patterns for poorer residents remain racially segregated has important implications 
for interpreting the maps in this report. Th e maps and data in this report can only demonstrate that donations are 
coming from more diverse neighborhoods. But because of continued racial and ethnic segregation in New York 
City, having a greater diversity of neighborhoods participate through small donor contributions likely translates 
directly into having a more diverse pool of donors. 
Figure A.1: Percentage Of Voting-Age Residents Who Are Black, By 2010 CBG. 
Figure A.2: Percentage Of Voting-Age Residents Who Are Hispanic, By 2010 CBG. 
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Figure A.3: Percentage Of Voting-Age Residents Who Are Asian, By 2010 CBG. 
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APPENDIX B: DIVERSITY AMONG NEW YORK STATE SENATE AND 
GUBERNATORIAL DONORS
Th e tables below show the demographic characteristics of neighborhoods in which small donors to gubernatorial 
and State Senate candidates live. When compared to Table 2, they demonstrate that the neighborhoods in which 
small donors in the gubernatorial and State Senate elections reside are even less representative of the city’s diversity 
than the neighborhoods in which State Assembly donors reside. 
Characteristics of the Block Groups of 
Gubernatorial Donors
Block Groups with Donors Whose 
Contributions to a Candidate Aggregate To …
$1-175 $176-$999 $1000 or more
Median Household Income 1999, CBGs w donors 
(Entire city: $38,293) $57,588 $73,758 $76,096
Poverty % in CBGs with donors (Entire city: 21%) 13% 9% 10%
Non-white % in CBGs with donors (Entire city: 55%) 28% 18% 17%
Education: % not completing high school (Entire city: 28%) 16% 9% 9%
Education: % with Bachelor’s degree or beyond (Entire city: 27%) 45% 62% 64%
Table B.1: Demographic Features Of CBGs With Donors At Varying Levels To Candidates For New York Governor (2010). 
Characteristics of the Block Groups of 
State Senate Donors
Block Groups with Donors Whose 
Contributions to a Candidate Aggregate To …
$1-175 $176-$999 $1000 or more
Median Household Income 1999, CBGs w donors 
(Entire city: $38,293) $49,893 $58,582 $69,263
Poverty % in CBGs with donors (Entire city: 21%) 16% 14% 12%
Non-white % in CBGs with donors (Entire city: 55%) 43% 33% 21%
Education: % not completing high school (Entire city: 28%) 21% 17% 12%
Education: % with Bachelor’s degree or beyond (Entire city: 27%) 37% 45% 55%
Table B.2: Demographic Features Of CBGs With Donors At Varying Levels To Candidates For State Senate (2010). 
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ENDNOTES 
1   Even if one adjusts for the fact that 2009 City Council candidates raised more money from private sources than 2010 
Assembly candidates, there would still be an adjusted 17 to 1 advantage in the number of donors from Bedford Stuyvesant 
and surrounding neighborhoods giving to City Council over Assembly candidates, 16 to 1 for Chinatown donors, and 8 to 
1 for donors from Upper Manhattan and lower Bronx.
2   Th e study predicted that a similar program would increase the importance of small donors from only 6 percent of current 
state candidates’ campaign funds to as much as 54 percent. See Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe & Brendan Glavin, 
Campaign Fin. Inst. What Is and What Could Be: The Potential Impact of Small-Donor Matching Funds in 
New York State Elections 4-6 (2012), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/NY/CFI_Impact-Matching-on-
NYS.pdf [hereinafter Malbin et al., What Is and What Could Be]; see also Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe & 
Brendan Glavin, SMALL DONORS, BIG DEMOCRACY: NEW YORK CITY’S MATCHING FUNDS AS A MODEL FOR THE NATION AND STATES 
in 11 Election L.J. 3, 7-16 (2012) [hereinafter Malbin et al., SMALL DONORS, BIG DEMOCRACY].
3   Interview with Jose M. Serrano, April 6, 2012. Interview with Eric Adams, April 12, 2012. Earlier interviews with candidates 
and public offi  cials about the eff ects the city’s matching fund system had on their fundraising practices may be found in 
Angela Migally & Susan Liss, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Small Donor Matching Funds: The NYC Election 
Experience 4, 12-14, 18-20 (2010), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/8116be236784cc923f_iam6benvw.pdf. 
4  U.S. Census Bureau, CARTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY FILES: CENSUS BLOCK GROUPS, Census.gov, http://www.census.gov/geo/
www/cob/bg_metadata.html (last visited May 2, 2012, 3:32 PM).
5  See Malbin et al., SMALL DONORS, BIG DEMOCRACY, supra note 2 , at 8. It is not likely that our results would have been 
substantively diff erent had we focused on a diff erent state-level offi  ce instead. As Table 1 and the additional tables in Appendix 
B demonstrate, small donor participation in New York State Senate and gubernatorial races was even lower than at the State 
Assembly level.
6  See Malbin et al., WHAT IS AND WHAT COULD BE, supra note 2 , at 3.
7   It would be wrong to presume that donor participation rates in the city have grown linearly under the city’s public fi nancing 
system. Most notably, the number of small donors made its largest leap between 1997 and 2001, the fi rst year in which New 
York City had instituted a multiple match. Th at substantial increase in small donor participation cannot be attributed solely 
to the multiple match, since 2001 was also a year in which in which an unprecedented number of candidates ran for a large 
number of open seats that were vacated by term limits. However, even 2005 — an election cycle with fewer open seats — saw 
a notable increase in small donor participation over 1997. Small donor participation rates in 2009 were higher still, even if 
they did not rise to the 2001 level. See Malbin et al., SMALL DONORS, BIG DEMOCRACY, supra note 2 , at 8.
8  See Migally & Liss, supra note 3 , at 12.
9   Th e analysis of donors provides the underpinning for tables showing the percentage of each state’s adult population that 
contributes to candidates, as well as CFI’s estimates of the likely impact of a variety of policy changes in each state. See 
Campaign Fin. Inst., INTERACTIVE TOOL FOR CITIZEN POLICY ANALYSTS, CFInst.org, http://www.cfinst.org/state/
CitizenPolicyTool.aspx (last visited May 3, 2012, 10:50 AM). See also Michael J. Malbin, & Peter Brusoe, “Small 
Donors, Big Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States”, 30 (July 14, 
2012) (working paper), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/NYC-as-a-Model.pdf (indicating the percentage 
of the voting age population contributing to gubernatorial or state legislative candidates in 2006 and to N.Y.C. Elections in 
2005 and 2009). 
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10   For citywide fi gures, see New York City Department of City Planning, Population Division, NYC 2000: Results 
from the 2000 Census—Socioeconomic Characteristics http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/census/sociopp.pdf 
(last visited May 2, 2012, 4:29 PM) and U.S. Census Bureau, PLACES OF 100,000 OR MORE POPULATION RANKED BY THE 
NUMBER OF WHITE ALONE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO, Ranking Tables for Places of 100,000 or More 
Population by Race Alone, Race Alone or in Combination, and Two or More Races (PHC-T-16), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-t16/tables/tab01.pdf.  
11   See American National Election Studies, Gave Money to a Political Campaign, 1952-2008: Percent Among Demographic 
Groups Who Responded, The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, http://www.electionstudies.
org/nesguide/2ndtable/t6b_5_2.htm (last visited May 3, 2012, 10:50 AM). See also Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman 
Schlozman & Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics 238 (Harvard Univ. 
Press 1995); Peter C. Francia, John C. Green, Paul S. Herrnson, Lynda W. Power & Clyde Wilcox, The Financiers 
of Congressional Elections 30 (Columbia Univ. Press, 2003). 
12   To obtain the percentage of total money raised in Assembly contests in 2010 that came from individual donors in these 
block groups, we follow these steps:
 1. We total the private contributions in our database coming from these block groups. 
 2.  We divide that quantity by 0.7. Th is estimate is meant to compensate for the fact that we were only able to verify the 
residential addresses of 70 percent of all private contributions in the city for Assembly candidates and some of these 
missing contributions could have come from these neighborhoods. 
 3.  Th e quantity obtained in #2 above is then divided by the total funds by all candidates in Assembly contests in 2010.
13   We estimate the total private funds received from these CBGs by dividing the sum of private funds in our donor dataset 
by 0.9. Th is estimate compensates for the fact that we were only able to verify the residential addresses of 90 percent of all 
private contributions in the city for City Council candidates, and some of the missing contributions could have come from 
these neighborhoods. Note that the adjustment is smaller for Council candidates than for Assembly candidates. Th erefore, 
if the procedure introduces any bias into the calculation, it is likely to work counter to our expected fi nding. 
14   To obtain the percentage of total money raised in City Council contests in 2009 that came from individual donors in these 
block groups, we follow these steps:
 1. We total the private contributions coming from these block groups. 
 2.  We then calculate the maximum possible amount of public matching funds that candidates could have received as a 
result of these private contributions — in other words, the total amount that would be generated by the six-to-one 
match if there were no cap on the amount of public matching funds that candidates could receive. We multiply that 
maximum amount by 0.62, which represents the fraction of the maximum possible amount of public matching funds 
that the average candidate actually was given. 
 3.  Adding together the private contributions and this reduced public funding total, we then divide that quantity by 0.9, 
for reasons explained in the previous footnote. 
 4.  Th e quantity obtained in #3 above is then divided by the total public and private funds for candidates in New York 
City Council contests in 2009 (minus self-fi nancing). 
15  See supra note 13. 
16   See supra note 14. 
17   See supra note 12. 
18   See supra note 12.
19  See supra note 13. 
20   See supra note 14. 
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